Class and Collective Actions
PAGA State of Play – Reform, Regulation, and Lasting Leverage
Since its inception, California’s Private Attorneys General Act has provided the plaintiff’s bar with a uniquely powerful tool. By deputizing “aggrieved employees” to enforce California’s Labor Code on the state’s behalf, PAGA has enabled private counsel to pursue civil action even when the individual employee’s harm may be minimal or even nonexistent. This framework has facilitated the rise of “headless” claims: representative actions where the named plaintiff dismisses their individual PAGA claim – often because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement – and exists as a procedural hook to assert representative PAGA claims on behalf of others. This risk-free practice, which often leverages boilerplate allegations to force extensive discovery or settlements, has largely benefited plaintiff’s counsel, while providing minimal recovery to the named plaintiff. Indeed, in reality, most of the money from a PAGA settlement doesn’t reach the employees: roughly a third goes to plaintiff’s counsel in attorneys’ fees, 65% of any PAGA penalties are paid to the state, and only 35% of any PAGA penalties goes towards the employees, which is then divided among all those covered by the claim – leaving each individual with a fraction of the total. PAGA litigation therefore often benefits lawyers and the state far more than the workers that the statute was designed to protect. Current legislative and administrative reforms sought to curb aggressive litigation tactics by refining penalty structures and dramatically expanding an employer’s right to “cure” identified violations. New administrative regulations aim to standardize filings and limit abusive practices while implementing procedural mechanisms, such as early judicial evaluation, that allow the courts to narrow the scope of the cases from the outset. Concurrently, case law continues to evolve regarding the enforceability of provisions in arbitration agreements that require adjudication of an individual employee’s PAGA claim in arbitration first, before the representative claims on behalf of other allegedly aggrieved employees can proceed in court (commonly called “headless” claims) – a question that has courts divided and is pending Supreme Court review[1] in a decision that could effectively end these “headless” PAGA claims. Yet, despite these reforms, one central reality persists: PAGA continues to exert significant pressure on employers. Filings remain robust, settlement incentives remain high, and trials are exceedingly rare. Compliance audits, cure efforts, and procedural refinements matter – but they do not eliminate the leverage embedded in representative claims or repeated filings. PAGA has been shaped, structured, and regulated – but it has not been diminished. The current landscape reflects a complex interplay of reform, litigation strategy, and enforcement dynamics, where standing, repeated filings, and settlement pressures continue to define employer exposure. Legislative Reform and Cure: Structure Without Contraction The July 2024 legislative amendments championed by Governor Gavin Newsom demonstrated a profound and meaningful effort to rein in abusive bounty-hunter litigation towards a system that incentivizes employer transparency. By implementing strict standing requirements and robust “cure” provisions, the amendments have sought to reduce the prevalence of opportunistic filings, on one hand, while simultaneously affording a larger share of recovered penalties delivered directly to the impacted work force, on the other. First, the 2024 reform tightened standing by requiring that a PAGA plaintiff personally suffer each specific alleged violation within the one‑year statute of limitations. This replaces the previous, highly permissive standard that allowed an employee to act as a proxy for the entire workforce and pursue penalties for a wide array of Labor Code violations they never actually experienced, so long as they suffered at least one unrelated violation, even if the underlying labor code violation was outside the statute of limitations. Put simply, this change requires PAGA plaintiffs to have more “skin in the game” for all the violations alleged, thus narrowing what claims an employee may pursue on behalf of others. In theory, the reforms created a procedural threshold that should filter out claims that exist primarily as leverage for settlements rather than vindicate actual employee harm. The 2024 reform has had particularly pronounced effects in headless PAGA cases – where the named plaintiff’s individual PAGA claim has been dismissed – raising the question as to whether that plaintiff retains standing to pursue the representative PAGA claims on behalf of others. This question, which has the courts divided, is now situated for Supreme Court review, and the answer is not purely academic; rather, this determination will inevitably influence settlement strategy, affect the effectiveness of arbitration, and shape how repeated filings are leveraged. In other words, if an employee’s individual PAGA claim is first compelled to arbitration, that employee must successfully arbitrate their claims in full before proceeding in court with respect to PAGA claims on behalf of others. In effect, counsel may have to actually litigate individual cases rather than simply leveraging settlements based on unverified representative claims. However, until resolved by the Supreme Court, representative claims can continue to generate significant pressure, independent of other procedural or statutory refinements, as counsel hems and haws about how the law will unfold until this decision has been rendered. Second, those reforms also refined how penalties are assessed and capped for common errors and expanded opportunities to cure violations by making aggrieved employees whole. On paper, through internal audits, employers can now identify and correct potential violations, implement compliance measures, and document “reasonable steps” that legally cap penalty exposure: 15% if completed before a PAGA demand or 30% if completed after notice of the PAGA action. As it stands, legislation is unclear as to how often these audits are to be performed, but an annual audit may ensure compliance well before any demand arises. Further, the 2024 amendments also offer an additional defense: once an employer has performed a qualifying audit and cured identified errors, they have a statutory right to “stay” subsequent litigation for early judicial evaluation through an early neutral evaluation (“ENE”). However, while the ENE promises to clarify disputed issues, evaluate proposed cures, and streamline resolution, the reality is that this forum is ripe with uncertainty and offers less flexibility than traditional mediation. Experienced neutrals and practitioners have raised concerns that this “newfangled” step may complicate rather than simplify resolution. Because the statute does not clearly map out what happens once an evaluation is initiated, parties may find themselves navigating a process that adds time and expense without necessarily making settlements easier or more likely than achieved by mediation with a mutually agreed-upon mediator who is trusted by both parties. Because very few PAGA actions ever go to trial, as most are resolved through negotiation or settlement long before formal adjudication, the true impact of these reforms is largely untested. Until these limitations are litigated, the practical effect of these reforms remains more theoretical in nature. Employers will likely cite to audits and cure efforts while plaintiff’s lawyers continue to cast aside their impact on settlement strategy. Further Legislative Reforms Attempt to Curtail the Reach of PAGA The ongoing tension between expanding enforcement and controlling abuse remains ever present in the legislative reforms and administrative developments. On February 2, 2026, the Legislature rejected Senate Bill 310 (“SB 310”), which sought to push back on the July 2024 reforms and create a standalone private right of action for untimely wage payments, which would increase PAGA penalties. Days later, on February 6, 2026, the LWDA Notice of Proposed Rulemaking demonstrated yet another meaningful effort to rein in PAGA. If adopted, these regulations would: Standardize administrative notice requirements and require detailed factual and evidentiary certification; Impose additional certification for high-frequency filers (200+ notices annually) with increased scrutiny for noncompliance; Clarify the cure process and how employers can document remediation; and Enhance oversight of settlements, including opportunities for affected employees to comment. However, these mechanisms do not materially change the economic incentive for plaintiffs to file broad, representative claims. The proposed rules may refine the process and filings, but repetitive, lightly modified claims will persist absent litigation as to the full impact and extent of these changes. The State of Play for PAGA and the Path Forward The recent PAGA reforms aim to narrow the statute’s reach, but their ultimate effect depends on how case law continues to solidify in 2026. Compliance programs, audits, and well-designed policies remain as critical as ever, and their importance will only grow if courts begin to give real weight to these defenses, providing meaningful tools to cap PAGA penalties. Historically, because most PAGA cases never reach a verdict, these actions have been driven by settlement pressure rather than adjudication. Yet, this evolution of PAGA presents opportunities for courts to impose meaningful caps on penalties for employers who conduct audits, cure and require individualized litigation before representative claims can proceed. This shift restores the significance of the individual employment relationship – historically sidelined in a lawyer-driven process – by requiring plaintiffs to personally suffer every alleged violation to maintain standing. Thus, by focusing on strong employee relationships and proving compliance, employers effectively neutralize the settlement-driven momentum that has largely driven PAGA litigation. [1] The California Supreme Court is expected to release its decision in Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. in early 2026, having granted review in April 2025, with a briefing schedule that concluded in December 2025.
April 6, 2026
by Hannah Green and Nisha Verma
Class and Collective Actions
Employers Offering Voluntary Benefits Face a New Wave of ERISA Litigation
Just about 20 years ago, Schlichter Bogard LLC, a prominent national plaintiffs’ law firm, filed a wave of putative ERISA class actions challenging how employers administered their 401(k) plans. Those cases led to two decades of litigation. Hundreds of similar cases were filed, resulting in billions in settlements and judgments. What largely started as a challenge to a discrete issue—how 401(k) plans used revenue sharing—quickly turned into lawsuits challenging almost every aspect of how employers and fiduciaries administer 401(k) plans. Just before Christmas 2025, the Schlichter firm once again delivered an unwelcome holiday surprise to employers across the United States. On December 23, Schlichter filed four nearly identical class action lawsuits targeting co-called “voluntary benefit plans.” The complaints named as defendants United Airlines, CHS/Community Health Systems, Laboratory Corporation of America Holdings, and Universal Services of America along with their benefits consultants—Mercer, Gallagher, Willis Towers Watson, and Lockton. These lawsuits represent what may well be the opening salvo in a new wave of ERISA litigation. Plaintiffs’ lawyers hope these cases will fundamentally reshape how employers offer voluntary benefits like accident, critical illness, cancer, and hospital indemnity insurance to their employees. “Voluntary Benefits” The term “voluntary benefits” is a colloquial term referring to non-traditional benefit plan options that employers might offer to their employees. Generally speaking, these plans offer benefits that traditional ERISA benefit plans (such as group health and disability plans) do not cover. Common examples include insurance that covers out-of-pocket costs resulting from accidents or hospital stays, or long-term care coverage. In theory, employers do not directly fund or sponsor these plans, but instead simply give insurers the opportunity to pitch these products to employees. Employees get the benefits of group rates along with the convenience of having premiums deducted from their paychecks. ERISA Coverage The first question raised by these cases is whether ERISA (and its fiduciary obligations) even apply. Many employers believe their voluntary benefits fall under a Department of Labor safe harbor (29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j)) that exempts such plans from ERISA coverage. To qualify for this exemption, four conditions must be met: (1) the employer cannot make any contributions to the plan (2) it must not receive more than reasonable compensation for administrative costs, (3) employee participation is completely voluntary, and (4) the employer does nothing to endorse or administer the plan beyond allowing payroll deductions. In the new wave of complaints, Schlichter argues that the employers have failed to satisfy the second and fourth requirements. The complaints allege that the employers indirectly benefited by receiving indirect compensation from the brokers and sponsors. The Schlichter complaints likewise argue that the employers have endorsed the plan by engaging in seemingly innocuous activities, such as notifying insurers of newly eligible employees, issuing enrollment reminders via email, or including the employer's logo on communication materials. The complaints also allege that the employers reportedly conceded in their Form 5500 filings with the Department of Labor that their voluntary benefit plans are subject to ERISA. The Allegations The four complaints make similar allegations. Each alleges that ERISA applies to these plans, and thus the employer has a fiduciary obligation to properly administer these plans. Each alleges that the employers breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA by failing to properly monitor and control the costs of these voluntary benefit programs. For example, the complaints contend that defendants failed to monitor premiums, failed to properly vet insurers and the plans’ loss ratios, and failed to monitor broker commissions. The complaint against United Airlines exemplifies Schlichter’s strategy. The approximately 50-page complaint alleges that United Airlines breached its fiduciary duties with respect to its voluntary benefit plan by failing to compare premiums charged to other similarly situated plans. It further alleges that the voluntary benefit programs allegedly adopted by United Airlines had subpar loss ratios (i.e., the amount that the plans paid out in benefits compared to the amount of premiums received). Further, the complaint presents a comparison showing that while comparable voluntary benefit programs had broker commissions averaging between 2.1% and 19% of premiums, United's program allegedly featured commissions of 36%, raising costs to participants. The complaint further alleges claims against United Airline’s broker, Mercer Health and Benefits Administration. The complaint alleges that Mercer became a fiduciary when it steered the employer toward more expensive, commission-rich products. The complaint further alleges that both United and Mercer engaged in self-dealing—Mercer profited from steering employees toward more expensive, commission-rich products while United allegedly benefited from indirect services and support provided by the broker. This dynamic created a conflict of interest that the complaint characterizes as operating at the expense of plan participants. Practical Steps To avoid the expenses and distraction of litigation, employers offering voluntary benefits should consider taking the following proactive steps to minimize litigation risk: Assess ERISA Coverage Status. Employers should carefully evaluate whether their voluntary benefit programs truly meet all four requirements of the Department of Labor's safe harbor exemption. If the plan involves any employer contribution, endorsement activities, or if the employer receives benefits from brokers/sponsors (cash or otherwise), future plaintiffs may allege, rightly or wrongly, that the plan falls under ERISA's fiduciary requirements. Employers should know that the open-ended nature of the DOL safe-harbor poses some challenges to employers seeking to comply with their duties under ERISA. To maximize the likelihood that ERISA will not apply, at a minimum, 5500 filings should be carefully reviewed to ensure the employer is not endorsing the plan as an ERISA plan if the employer is not treating it as an ERISA plan. Ensure ERISA Fiduciary Compliance: Even if the employer does not believe the plan is covered by ERISA, given the risks the employer should consider administering the plan as if it were governed by ERISA. This can include soliciting competitive bids from multiple carriers, engaging in RFPs periodically, and carefully documenting the decisions the employer makes along with the reasons for such decisions. Demand Broker Transparency. Request full disclosure of all broker compensation, including base commissions, contingent commissions, bonuses, and any other forms of payment received from carriers. The Schlichter complaints emphasize the alleged failure to disclose conflicts of interest, so documenting these arrangements and evaluating whether compensation is reasonable is essential. Consider, for example, moving to a flat fee arrangement or otherwise limiting the possibility that brokers might have a conflict of interest. Document Fiduciary Processes. Establish and follow formal procedures for selecting carriers, monitoring plan performance, and reviewing costs. Maintain detailed records of committee meetings, requests for proposals, carrier evaluations, and the rationale for decisions. Review Insurance Loss Ratios. Request and analyze loss ratio data from carriers—the percentage of premiums actually paid out in claims. Avoid Indirect Benefits: To avoid self-dealing claims (and ensure compliance with the safe harbor), employers should ensure that they do not receive compensation from then brokers or insurers in connection with the voluntary benefit plan. Looking Ahead Interest in these lawsuits is exceptionally high given Schlichter Bogard's track record. If history repeats itself, the four initial complaints may represent just the first batch of a much larger litigation campaign. For employers offering voluntary benefits, the message is clear: voluntary benefit plans are targets for plaintiffs’ class action firms. Benefits consultants and brokers face similar pressures to demonstrate that their compensation is reasonable and that they are acting in plan participants' best interests rather than their own. As these cases proceed through the courts, the entire voluntary benefits industry will be watching closely to see whether Schlichter Bogard can replicate its 401(k) litigation success in this new arena. The immediate risk to unprepared employers can be significant. Taking proactive steps now to evaluate ERISA coverage, enhance oversight processes, and ensure broker arrangements serve participants' interests, can help employers avoid becoming the next target in Schlichter Bogard's litigation campaign. _____________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________________ "Reprinted with permission from the February 2, 2026 edition of the New York Law Journal © 2026 ALM Global Properties, LLC. All rights reserved. Further duplication without permission is prohibited, contact 877-256-2472 or asset-and-logo-licensing@alm.com."
February 4, 2026
by Nicholas J. Pappas and Andrew Holly
Class and Collective Actions
The Evolving PAGA Landscape: 2024 Reforms, "Headless" Claims, and What's Next for Employers
California’s employment law landscape is changing fast — and this time, it’s simply not a minor revision to the Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (PAGA). The 2024 legislative reforms and the growing split among appellate courts over so-called “headless” PAGA claims reveal a widening gap between statutory reform and judicial practice. First, “headless claims” arise when an employee dismisses their individual PAGA claim—often because the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) mandates enforcement of an arbitration agreement—but seeks to continue only the representative claims on behalf of other allegedly aggrieved employees. This strategy, increasingly used by plaintiffs’ counsel to bypass arbitration, has divided California’s appellate courts on a critical question: does a plaintiff retain standing to pursue representative PAGA claims once their individual claims are dismissed? Second, the 2024 amendments to PAGA – effective June 19, 2024 – create tools for employers to defend against PAGA actions. The reforms redefine who qualifies as an “aggrieved employee,” expand employers’ opportunities to cure alleged violations, and reduce penalties where reasonable compliance efforts are shown. Most notably, the reforms impose a personal standing requirement: employees may only pursue penalties for Labor Code violations they personally experienced. This change curtails the “kitchen-sink” approach to PAGA pleadings and limits who may serve as a proxy for the state under the Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA). Together, these developments mark a pivotal moment for one of California’s most powerful wage-and-hour enforcement tools. At the center lies a collision between California’s public enforcement model under the LWDA and the FAA’s mandate to enforce arbitration agreements – a collision that could fundamentally reshape how, and by whom, California labor laws are enforced. I. The LWDA’s Role — and Its Limits, Particularly with the Result on Headless Claims The LWDA’s position as the “real party in interest” in every PAGA case defines what these actions are, and what they are not. PAGA suits are not private disputes between an employer and an employee; they are enforcement actions brought on behalf of the state. In Rose v. Hobby Lobby Stores, Inc., the First District reaffirmed that while the LWDA owns the substantive rights being enforced, it is not financially responsible for litigation costs when it does not intervene. The LWDA holds the substantive right being enforced, but delegates its prosecution, permitting private plaintiffs act as its proxies. That balance worked under the former PAGA structure, but the LWDA’s ability to act through private enforcement may be curtailed in practice, should “headless” claims be disavowed. In effect, the state will still own the claims, but those claims will live or die based on the private employee’s arbitration. II. The "Headless Claims" Conundrum: A Circuit Split in Action If the California Supreme Court sides with the Second District and rejects headless claims, plaintiffs will be required to arbitrate their entire individual case before representing anyone else. On paper, that’s a win for employers — reinforcing arbitration programs and narrowing sprawling PAGA exposure. But beneath that surface lies a fundamental limitation on the LWDA’s ability to act through private plaintiffs. Here’s how the appellate landscape currently breaks down: Appellate District Position Key Case(s) Reasoning Second Appellate District Rejected headless claims entirely Leeper v. Shipt, Inc. (Dec. 2024) (pending review) Williams v. Alacrity Solutions Group, LLC (April 2025) PAGA includes individual and non-individual claims, regardless of how the complaint is framed, so purely headless claims cannot avoid arbitration. Fourth Appellate District Permitted headless claims on purely procedural grounds Rodriguez v. Packers Sanitation Services LTD., LLC (Feb. 2025) (pending review) There is no individual PAGA claim to compel to arbitration in a purely headless claim, but this leaves open the potential for other pleading challenges, such as demurrer or motion to strike. Fifth Appellate District Permitted headless claims pre-2024 bill reforms CRST Expedited, Inc. v. Superior Court (July 2025) Galarsa v. Dolgen California, LLC (Oct. 2025) PAGA’s representative structure provides three choices: (1) to pursue only their individual violations; (2) to pursue only non-individual violations; or (3) to pursue both. Although the outcome of these cases will impact litigation strategy, all involve pre-reform PAGA claims, and have yet to address the implications of the post-2024 statutory standing requirement, which adds yet another layer of complexity moving forward. III. The Federal Constraints to PAGA – And What Remains Constant Despite the uncertainty surrounding headless claims, two federal pillars remain constant: the FAA and the Labor Management Relations Act (LMRA). Both impose preemption doctrines that define where federal law overrides state law — but they do so in very different ways. The FAA governs arbitration agreements, ensuring valid agreements are enforced unless a specific exemption applies. For example, in Villalobos v. Maersk, Inc. (October 2025), there was no individual claim subject to arbitration because the plaintiff was a transportation worker exempt from the FAA. Simply, as made clear by the court in Villalobos, case authority related to headless claims cannot be used to bootstrap FAA coverage where none exists. Meanwhile, under the LMRA, preemption arises only when resolution of a PAGA claim requires interpretation of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). In Renteria-Hinojosa v. Sunsweet Growers, Inc. (9th Cir. Aug. 2025), the court held that PAGA claims are not preempted if they merely reference, rather than interpret, a CBA. However, when an employee’s claim depends on exhausting a CBA’s grievance process, LMRA preemption applies. These federal anchors – FAA enforceability and LMRA preemption – remain stable amid California’s shifting state-law terrain and thus serve as guideposts in assessing arbitration risk and preemption defenses. IV. A New PAGA for a New Era With the California Supreme Court poised to decide Leeper and Rodriguez, and the 2024 reforms already in effect, PAGA is entering a defining chapter. The unanswered question is whether the LWDA can still meaningfully enforce labor laws through deputized private plaintiffs if every case must begin (and possibly end) in individual arbitration. For employers, that paradox is striking: a ruling requiring arbitration of individual claims first in all instances could mark the quiet sunset of PAGA’s broadest enforcement powers. Either way, the coming year will reshape the balance between state enforcement and federal arbitration mandates — and that balance will define the next decade of California wage-and-hour litigation.
October 10, 2025
by Hannah Green and Nisha Verma