National Origin Discrimination
What is the CROWN Act, what do I need to know about it, and how should employers prepare for it?
On March 18, 2022, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the Creating a Respectful and Open World for Natural Hair (CROWN) Act by way of a party line vote of 235-189. In general, the federal CROWN Act and similar state acts explicitly prohibit discrimination on the basis of a person’s natural hair. More specifically, the proposed federal legislation prohibits “discrimination based on a person’s hair texture or hairstyle if that style or texture is commonly associated with a particular race or national origin” and seeks to ban race-based hair discrimination in the workplace, federal programs, and public accommodations. The U.S. Senate has not yet voted on the Act. If enacted into law, the federal law would be treated as incorporated into Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which, among other things, already bans discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. While the fate of the bill at the Senate is unknown, several states have already passed similar CROWN Acts and several others have introduced CROWN Acts in the hopes of making it law. Given the national attention the CROWN Act has received, employers are smart to ask which states already have these laws in effect and what they need to know about these laws so they can prepare. Do any states have their own CROWN Acts? Yes. California was the first state to pass a CROWN Act in 2019 and, as of the date of this post, 16 states have passed similar legislation. To date, the following states have passed similar state or territory-level hair discrimination laws: California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Nebraska, Nevada, New Jersey, New Mexico, New York, Oregon, Tennessee, Virginia, Washington, and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Localities in various states including Arizona, Colorado, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Missouri, New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Texas, Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin have also instituted ordinances or other directives prohibiting hairstyle and texture-based discrimination. State hair discrimination laws are similar to the federal law, but consulting an experienced labor and employment attorney as to your state’s CROWN Act is recommended. Why are CROWN Acts passed? Proponents of these laws view the legislation as way to address systemic racism and to prohibit the removal from—or denial of—employment due to an individual’s natural hairstyle. For a long time, courts declined to recognize that discrimination on the basis of someone’s appearance could be discrimination on the basis of that person’s race or national origin. Advocates of CROWN Acts say this historical lack of protection from hair discrimination is largely due to a lack of understanding about how a person’s hair choices are connected to their race or national origin. The hair discrimination laws being introduced and passed are an attempt to address this issue. What do courts have to say about the issue? This issue played out between disagreeing appellate judges in EEOC v. Catastrophe Mgmt. Sols., 876 F.3d 1273, 1274 (11th Cir. 2017). In that case, an employer refused to hire any applicant who had an “excessive hairstyle” and ultimately relied upon that policy in declining to hire a Black woman who wore her hair in dreadlocks. The Eleventh Circuit held that “dreadlocks are not, according to the EEOC’s proposed amended complaint, an immutable characteristic of black individuals.” The majority’s rationale was that a person does not have to wear their hair in dreadlocks, therefore dreadlocks are not immutable and not protected under Title VII. The EEOC argued that “dreadlocks are protected under Title VII because they are culturally and physiologically associated with individuals of African descent,” the exact sentiment underlying CROWN Acts. One judge wrote a scathing dissent, stating: The discriminatory animus that motivates an employer to ban dreadlocks offends the antidiscrimination principle embodied in Title VII just as much as the discriminatory animus motivating a ban on Afros. Both are distinctly African-American racial traits. . . . In other words, when an aspect of a person’s appearance marks her as a member of a protected class and her employer then cites that racial marker as the reason for taking action against her, the employee’s race probably had something to do with it. Whether that racialized aspect of her appearance is ‘immutable’ such as skin color or ‘mutable’ such as hair is beside the point. Either way, the employer’s action based on a racial identifier is an action based on the employee's race. Legal disputes asserting claims of hair-based discrimination continue to be filed, including a lawsuit filed by a Black man who applied for re-employment following furlough. The plaintiff’s lawsuit asserts that he was told by the hiring manager that he would have to conform his appearance to company policy, which meant that he would need to cut his locs. See Thornton v. Encore Group USA LLC, No. 37-2021-00049996 (Cal. Super. Nov. 29, 2021) This and other disputes centering around alleged hairstyle or texture discrimination appear to be here to stay, particularly with the increasing number of state laws providing an avenue for workers to seek redress. What does the CROWN Act momentum mean for employers? Hair discrimination laws seek to expand the scope of characteristics that may give rise to actionable claims of discrimination, including in the workplace. Given the current momentum behind this movement and legislative trends, employers operating in states or localities with hair discrimination laws should be mindful of these new protections for workers. Employers should also consider revisiting dress and/or grooming policies to ensure that they do not prohibit employees from wearing particular hairstyles commonly connected to racial, ethnic, and religious identity. Additional training for management personnel and those with interviewing or hiring responsibilities—including implicit bias training—may also be beneficial to ensure that hiring decisions are based upon proper grounds, and do not implicate potential hair-based discrimination. If you are an employer in one of these states seeking guidance on your state’s new CROWN Act, or if you are an employer seeking guidance on how you can guard against hair discrimination in the workplace regardless of your state’s laws, you should contact an experienced labor and employment attorney.
July 6, 2022
National Origin Discrimination
Refusal to Transfer an Employee as an Adverse Employment Action; or, How Life Imitates 1950s Movies
In the classic 1955 movie, Mister Roberts, Henry Fonda plays Doug Roberts, a frustrated Naval officer aboard a supply ship in a backwater area of the Pacific during World War II. Roberts desperately seeks a transfer to a combat ship more directly involved in the war, but he is continually – and maliciously – turned down by Captain Morton, portrayed by Jimmy Cagney: Doug Roberts: “I'm asking for it! If I can't get transferred, I'll get court martialed off! I'm fed up!” Capt. Morton: “No. You're a smart boy, Roberts. But I know how to take care of smart boys. I hate your guts, you smart college guys! . . . now YOU can take it for a change! The worst thing I can do to you... is to keep you right here, Mister, and here is where you're going to stay. Now, GET OUT!” Although Roberts eventually gets his transfer to a combat ship, many employees share his frustration when their employer denies a transfer to another location or position. If the requested, but denied, transfer involves no additional money and is not a promotion, has the employee suffered the type of adverse employment action that will support a lawsuit? Many types of employment lawsuits require an adverse action by the employer. The classic example is firing the employee for an illegal reason, such as racial discrimination. Other examples include refusing to hire a qualified applicant, denying a promotion, or refusing to grant a raise. However, when there is no tangible benefit to the requested action, at least some precedent holds that the employee has no basis to sue, even if the denial of the requested action is based on race or another protected status. A recent decision from the Court of Appeals for the D.C. Circuit demonstrates that even an allegedly discriminatory action can fail to provide the basis for a lawsuit, if it involves only “subjective” injury to the employee. In Samuel Ortiz-Diaz v. Dep’t of Housing and Urban Development, Mr. Ortiz-Diaz had worked as an investigator in Washington D.C. under a supervisor named McCarty. Ortiz-Diaz came to believe that McCarty had issues working with Hispanic males and sought a transfer to Albany, New York or Hartford, Connecticut. His request was denied. The transfer would not have been a promotion; indeed, some evidence suggested that it might require Ortiz-Diaz to take a pay cut or reduction in job grade. Ortiz-Diaz sued, alleging unlawful race and national origin discrimination. The district court granted the government employer summary judgment, on the grounds that a purely lateral transfer was not an “adverse employment action.” On appeal, a divided D.C. Circuit court affirmed the dismissal. The majority ruled that the purely “subjective” injury of working for a supervisor who dislikes you is not a basis for a federal discrimination claim. The Court also rejected Ortiz-Diaz’s argument that a transfer would enhance his future opportunities for promotion, on the ground that that was mere speculation. The case provoked two concurring opinions and a vigorous dissent. One concurrence specifically noted that the requirement of a tangible injury would not apply to harassment cases. A second stated that the result was based only on adherence to prior precedent, and expressed his “skepticism” about the wisdom of the ruling. A third judge dissented, arguing that the evidence was disputed as to whether the transfer would actually enhance Ortiz-Diaz’s career prospects, so summary judgment was improper. The dissent also noted that other federal courts of appeal have looked more favorably on claims based on lateral transfers. The case presents several important points for the employer to bear in mind: At least in some circumstances, an employee’s claim of discrimination is not sufficient for a lawsuit, where the employer has not taken any actual (and harmful) action against the employee based on the alleged discrimination; However, any actions in the workplace based on discriminatory motives present problems and risks for employers. Ortiz-Diaz’s claims might have fared better in a different federal court, and harassment claims do not require an adverse employment action; The case also illustrates, for both employers and employees, the importance of presenting cogent, non-speculative evidence at the summary judgment stage. If Ortiz-Diaz had been able to present better evidence that the requested transfer would help his career prospects, he might well have prevailed. So unlike Mister Roberts in the movie, Ortiz-Diaz did not get his transfer and remained stuck working for McCarty in D.C. On the other hand, Mister Roberts’ transfer did not produce the desired tangible benefits either; he is killed in a kamikaze attack aboard his new ship. Be careful what you wish for.
September 28, 2017